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This paper explores to what degree within-firm synchronization of price changes exists, and 
also the existence of synchronisation between firms in the same industry. We find strong 
evidence of within-firm synchronization. This synchronization is independent of the direction 
of the price changes, supporting the theory of economies of scope in menu costs. The industry 
synchronization effects are found to be small, suggesting that firms either have a degree of 
pricing power, and/or that the costs of changing prices in response to their competitors’ 
behavior exceed the benefits. Our findings give support to the prevalence of menu costs, scope 
economies in price changes, and a high degree of within-firm synchronization already 
documented in a number of countries (Lach and Tsiddon, 1996; Fisher and Konieczny, 2000; 
Midrigan, 2011; Alvarez and Lippi, 2014; Bhattarai and Schoenle, 2014; Yang, 2020; Dedola 
et al., 2019; Letterie and Nilsen, 2021; Bonomo et al., 2020). Combined with earlier literature 
these findings have potentially important implications for the micro-foundations of 
macroeconomic models and monetary policy 
 
2. Data and methodological issues 
The primary dataset consists of monthly survey data for approximately 630 distinct product 
groups, for which prices are collected by Statistics Norway to construct the Norwegian producer 
price index (PPI).1 The monthly prices are merged with annual firm level information, using 
the firm identifiers in the price survey data. The firm level information includes records on the 
number of employees, net revenues, and wage costs. Missing or incomplete records are deleted. 
If prices are reduced by more than 49%, or increased by more than 99%, these observations are 
excluded.2 The final dataset covering the manufacturing industry contains 166 466 price 
 
1 Not all firms are surveyed, and firms may be targeted for certain, but not all of their products. Firms 
represented in the price data tend to be larger than the average of Norwegian firms. 
2 A price change is calculated as  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
, where i denotes product, j firm in industry k in period t. 
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observations for 2 880 unique products, distributed across 516 firms covering the years 2005-
2016.3 
 To measure synchronisation two indicator variables are defined, Uijk,t and Dijk,t, taking 
the value one if a price change is positive or negative, respectively, where i  denotes product, j 
denotes firm in industry k in period t. The fraction of within-firm positive and negative price 
changes, UFijk,t and DFijk,t, is then given by the sum of Uijk,t and Dijk,t respectively, over the sum 
















































where K(t) denotes the total number of industries, I(t) denotes the total number of products, and 
Zjk,t is the observed number of products within firm j and industry k in period t. The within-
industry fractions are calculated in correspondence as the within-firm synchronisation indices, 
i.e. by summing the number of upward and downward changes over all products and firms for 
each industry in a given time period, excluding the good we are trying to explain. 
We use the HS code to categorize the products.4 From Figure 1 we see a substantial part 
of the unique HS-codes only has one product in our sample independent of aggregation. At the 
4-digit HS level, 67% of the observed products have relevant competing products. We therefore 
categorise our products according to the 4-digit HS code.   
 
“Figure 1: Number of products per HS code” 
 
 
3 We focus on prices recorded in the domestic market only, as prices of imported and exported products 
are likely to be set considering different criterion, for instance changing exchange rates. 
4 The Harmonized System, HS, is an international customs and statistical nomenclature (SSB, 2020).  
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The HS 4-digit product groups are grouped into the behavioral categories “frequent” 
and “infrequent” price changes. If a HS 4-digit product group has an average share of price 
changes below (above) 0.09 per year, i.e. slightly above one change per year, it is defined to be 
a group with “infrequent” (“frequent”) price changes. 69% of the products are classified as 
frequent changers. Thus, heterogeneity in the data are addressed to some degree. 
 
 3. Empirical results 
We apply a standard multinomial logit model with three discrete outcomes; negative- , no-, and 
positive- price changes.5 We include 2-digit SIC sectoral monthly PPI to control for exogenous 
shocks at the sector level. Log-transformed wage per employee is also included as control 
variable, since wages are a major cost component for firms.6 Finally, yearly and monthly 
dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered at firm level to mitigate potential problems 
related to the dependency between the various products within a firm.  
 
“Table 1: Multinomial Logit Model Results” 
 
The upper panel of Table 1 shows significant relationships between the fraction of both 
positive and negative price changes within the firm and the probability of positive and negative 
price changes. The marginal effects seem to be somewhat larger when we consider only the 
products with frequent price changes, suggesting a higher degree of within-firm 
synchronization of price changes for these products compared to all products. All within-firm 
marginal effects are positive, suggesting that an increasing share of positive price changes 
within the firm also increase the probability of a negative price change, and vice versa. If the 
observed synchronization was solely caused by firm specific shocks, we would not see this as 
 
5 Firms tend to behave differently when increasing and decreasing prices (Ball and Mankiw, 1994). 




such a shock would impact all products within a firm in the same direction. However, in the 
presence of economies of scope in menu costs the result seems fully reasonable; a firm can very 
well choose to reduce the price of one product while increasing the price of most other.  
The lower panel of Table 1 gives the marginal effect of the fraction of both 
positive/negative prices changes to see the average effect of price changes of the other products. 
The marginal effects (dy/dx) are in between the corresponding individual fractions up and 
down, while the marginal effects of a one standard deviation change (+/- 1/2 Std.Dev) are 
somewhat larger relative to the corresponding individual fractions – caused by larger std. dev 
of the fraction of prices changes relative to the individual ones. 
We plot the predicted probabilities of the three discrete outcomes using the estimates 
for the frequently changing products. Figure 2a shows that the probabilities of both a positive- 
and a negative- price change on a given product increase as the fraction of positive price 
changes in the same firm increases. The effect is strongest for the probability of a positive 
change. Conversely, the probability of not changing the price of product i decreases as the 
fraction of positive changes increases. We see the same trends in Figure 2b, the probability of 
a change increases with the fraction of negative changes in the firm. Both plots suggest a strong 
degree of within-firm price synchronization. 
 
“Figure 2a: Prob. of price change conditional on the fraction of other positive changes in firm”  
“Figure 2b: Prob. of price change conditional on the fraction of other negative changes in firm”  
 
Turning to between-firms price synchronization, we see that even though the marginal 
effect of the fraction of positive price changes in the industry is statistically significantly, the 
economic effect is small. When graphing the estimated probabilities conditional on the share of 
other price changes in the industry (not shown, but available from the authors on request), the 
predicted probabilities stay relatively unchanged as the fractions of positive and negative price 
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changes in the industry vary. One potential explanation for the weak between-firms price 
synchronisation, also found by Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014), might be monopoly power in the 
manufacturing sector. Note however, the left bar in Figure 1 shows that 67% (1 minus 33%) of 
the products have relevant competing products - even though parts of these are products within 
the same firms. On the other hand, small price changes by competitors may not be matched 
when the firm faces menu costs (Ball and Romer, 1991). It is also worth pointing out that at 
least for the positive price changes in the upper panel of Table 1, firms are responding positively 
to competitors’ price increases, and negatively to competitors’ price reduction such that pricing 
decisions are strategic complements. For negative price changes the marginal effects of the 
industry price changes are all statistically insignificant.7 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
We find the synchronization of price changes to be largely independent of the direction of 
changes. This supports the theory of scope economies in menu costs rather than firm- or sector-
specific shocks, as such shocks are likely to impact all products in the same direction. As 
emphasized in literature, within-firm synchronization reduces the responsiveness of a single 
product price to shocks, as the pricing decision depend on the benefits of changing other prices 
too. The between-firm synchronization within the 4-digit HS product groups are of minor 
importance in explaining pricing behaviour. A potential limitation of these latter findings is the 
relatively few competitors in some of the narrowly defined industries.  
The economics of scope in the price change technology found might reduce the degree 
of state dependency. This again might affect the importance of selection effects in menu-cost 
 
7 We have included lags of (log-transformed) wages and lags of sectorial PPIs as control variables in 
one set of regressions. The marginal effects from these new regressions are hardly changing relative to 
the ones in Table 1 (see Table A1). 
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models, and in the end, the degree of monetary non-neutrality, thus the response of real 






Alvarez, F. and Lippi, F. (2014). Price setting with menu cost for multiproduct firms. 
Econometrica, 82(1):89–135. 
Ball, L. and Mankiw, N.G. (1994). Asymmetric price adjustment and economic fluctuations. 
Economic Journal, 104(423):247–261. 
Ball, L. and D. Romer (1991) Sticky Prices as Coordination Failure, American Economic 
Review, 81(3): 539-552.  
Bhattarai, S. and Schoenle, R. (2014). Multiproduct firms and price-setting: Theory and 
evidence from U.S. producer prices. Journal of Monetary Economics, 66:178–192. 
Bonomo, M., Carvalho, C., Kryvtsov, O., Ribon, S. and Rigato, R. (2020). Multi-product 
pricing: Theory and evidence from large retailers in Israel. WP 20-12. Bank of Canada. 
Dedola, L., Kristoffersen, M.S. and Zullig, G. (2019). Price synchronization and cost 
passthrough in multiproduct firms: Evidence from Danish producer prices. Mimeo. 
Fisher, T.C.G. and Konieczny, J.D. (2000). Synchronization of price changes by multiproduct 
firms: evidence from Canadian newspaper prices. Economics Letters, 68: 271-277. 
Lach, S. and Tsiddon, D., (1996). Staggering and Synchronization in Price-Setting: Evidence 
from Multiproduct Firms. American Economic Review, 86(5): 1175-1196. 
Letterie, W. and Nilsen, Ø.A. (2021). Pricing behaviour and menu costs in multiproduct firms. 
Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway.  
Midrigan, V. (2011). Menu costs, multiproduct firms, and aggregate fluctuations. 
Econometrica, 79(4):1139–1180. 
NOU (2019), “Official Norwegian Reports 2019:6, The Basis for Wage Settlements”, Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs, Oslo, Norway. 
SSB (2020). Producer price index. Statistics Norway. https://www.ssb.no/priser-og-
prisindekser/statistikker/ppi. 
Yang, C. (2020). Rational inattention, menu costs, and multi-product firms: Micro evidence 








Note: For each aggregate of the HS code, the number of products in a year is found. We then calculate 
the means over the years, and round to nearest integer. For the same HS aggregates, we show the 





Figure 2a: Prob. of price change conditional on the fraction of other positive changes in firm 
 
 
Figure 2b: Prob. of price change conditional on the fraction of other negative changes in firm 
 
Note: Estimates based on the multinomial logit model – products with frequent changes. Predicted 
probabilities are calculated for HS2 category 36 "Plastics and articles thereof" in April 2010. All other 
variables are held at their mean. The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors 








Notes: “Positive (Negative) price change” gives the marginal effect on the probability of a positive 
(negative) price change. Control variables include sector specific PPI, (log-transformed) wages, 
monthly- and yearly dummies, and industry dummies at the HS2 level. Standard errors clustered at 
firm level in parentheses. Marginal effects are calculated for HS2-category 36 “Plastics and articles 
thereof” in April 2010, all other variables held at their mean. The shares of positive and negative price 
changes for “all products” are 14.8% and 9.9%, respectively, and for “products with frequent changes” 
19.4% and 13.9%, respectively. 
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Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
Number of observations: All products - 149 660 , Products with frequent changes  - 112 229. 
       
Note: In this set of results, lagged (1 year) wage costs and lagged wages (1 month) are included  
           as additional control variables relative to the ones in Table 1. See also notes to Table 1. 
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